I
guess anyone who served in that part of the world and in that era has his own
Vietnam Memorial tucked away inside his head; I know I have mine. I think I have seen some of those other
private memorials in the faces of those who have visited the black marble slabs
on The Mall in Washington DC. It doesn't
necessarily have to be someone who served there; parents and siblings have
their memorials too. Those who actually
fought there, however, share a fellowship which make their memorials different
from those of parents, sisters, brothers, and friends.
In
my memory are at least six people whose names are somewhere on those marble
slabs. Some of them died in separate
incidents, but one event stands out clearly and is not much dimmed by the passage
of time. It is a story of courage,
dedication and sacrifice: it is the story of Bat 21.
It
happened April 2, 1972, some time around 1530 local time. Easter Sunday. I am sure that there was other fighting and
dying going on at that time, so in the grand scheme of things maybe this memory
is like so many others. The North
Vietnamese had begun their spring offensive across the 17th Parallel – The DMZ
– three days earlier on 30 March. The
fighter jocks coming back from the morning missions that Sunday were talking
about the huge amount of traffic on The Trail. I recall one young fighter jock who worked
The Frag Shop with me saying that Ban Karai Pass looked like the Los Angeles
Freeway.
I
was assigned as a navigator to the 42nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
(42nd TEWS). I flew missions with the
squadron, but I also converted the basic orders to conduct electronic warfare
operations into something that the air crews could use to plan and carry out
their assigned missions. The orders were
called fragmentary orders, since they were the day to day execution of a larger
plan known as an operation order. We
shortened the term fragmentary to frag, and the place where they were
interpreted was a "shop," thus, it was the Frag Shop. I was working the Frag Shop that day; it was
rainy and gray at Korat Royal Thai Air Base.
I had given the usual mission briefing to the crews of Bat 21 and Bat
22. Theirs was the usual
assignment: provide electronic countermeasures
against the SAM threat to B-52s bombing in the area of the DMZ. The targets were new; they had been changed
that morning from the orders originally transmitted from "Blue Chip." At noon it had already been a hectic day full
of changes and then changes to changes as the full extent of the North
Vietnamese invasion took shape.
 |
| Bat 22 |
Bat
22 was an EB-66E. It was the primary
jamming aircraft, and its mission was fairly simple: turn on all the jammers at the appointed
time, keep between the threat and the B-52s (as much as possible, since at the
time, we electronic warfare crews were forbidden to enter North Vietnamese
airspace), and stay around the target area for the specified period of
time. Bat 21 was another thing; it was
an EB-66C. Its primary mission was to
ferret out enemy radars: to
electronically identify them, record their parameters, and to locate them to
the extent that it was possible to do so.
Its secondary mission was ECM, but it was better suited to its role as
an Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) gatherer. Frequently, the ELINT bird would
simple cruise quietly through the target area looking for threat signals while
the companion ECM bird provided the required jamming support.
Bat
22 carried the usual crew of three:
pilot, navigator and electronic warfare officer (EW). The navigator and EW sat side by side just
behind the pilot and separated from the pilot by equipment racks and
consoles. The entire crew sat in the
nose of the aircraft, ahead of the forward fuel tank. Bat 21 carried six people: pilot, navigator, and four EWs. To this day, I can remember and recite the
names of that crew as if I had just looked at the daily flight schedule. The four EWOs (also called Ravens) sat tucked
in between the forward and aft fuel tanks in what had once been the bomb bay of
the aircraft. It was their own little
world, and it was effectively isolated from the pilot and navigator who sat
diagonally across from one another up in the nose of the EB-66C.
 |
Bat 21
|
It
seemed routine coming into the target area near Cam Lo. The weather was cloudy, but that didn't
prevent the B-52s from performing their mission. They were dropping under radar control and
knew exactly where the bombs were going.
It wasn't good SAM avoidance weather, though. For the most
effective SAM avoidance, clear weather was preferred. You don't always get what you want, however,
and, as always, the crews end up taking things as they come.
Sometime
after Bat 22 turned on his jammers, it happened. The EWO on Bat 22 heard the familiar
"rattlesnake" of the SA-2 guidance signal. A SAM (probably more than one) was on the way
and the sound of the rattlesnake was an electronic signal from the launch site
which indicated that the SAM was being guided toward its target. The Ravens on Bat 21 also saw and heard the
signal. The pilots on Bat 21 and Bat 22
also heard the warning through their RHAW equipment and saw a visual estimate of the direction and proximity of the
launch site.
The
rattlesnake was a real attention-getter.
I can recall more than one EWO responding to that sound. The urgency of the situation came out
differently for each EWO, but there was no mistaking what was happening. I have a mission tape from one of the more
challenging sorties I flew while on that tour of duty with the 42nd TEWS. Even now, if I listen to the part that
includes the rattlesnake, the hair on the back of my neck rises.
Something
was wrong. The threat was coming from
what should have been friendly territory!
"SAM coming up on the right" was the warning to Bat 21's pilot
from the Ravens in the bomb bay. Things
were probably a bit confusing; there should not have been SAMs in the direction
the equipment said the threat was coming from; just the day before that had
been friendly territory. We had received
nothing to indicate it was not still friendly.
The pilot began a breaking right turn to avoid the SAMs, but he should
have turned the opposite direction to avoid the approaching missiles. Did he misinterpret the Ravens' warning? As soon as the break had begun, one of the
Ravens saw what was happening and told the pilot to break left.
The
pilot began to reverse the break; by doing so Bat 21 would re-cross its
original flight path, and doing that made it more likely that the missile would
strike its target. The maneuver probably
sealed the fate of Bat 21 and its crew.
The SAM was probably moving at Mach 3.0 or more by that time. Faster than a rifle bullet, its 450 pound
high explosive warhead detonated into the underside of Bat 21.
The
SA-2 "Guideline" missile was designed to project the explosive force
of its warhead in a conical pattern forward along its flight path. When the missile warhead detonated, Bat 21
was instantly riddled with shrapnel and debris from the explosion. The wing and fuselage fuel tanks gushed JP-4;
the hydraulic system, broken in countless places, sprayed red hydraulic fluid,
like blood from severed arteries, throughout the aircraft and into the
sky. Engine oil tanks ruptured during
the detonation and no longer fed lubricating oil to the engines. Oxygen and electrical lines were broken in
countless places throughout the airframe.
The
effect was immediate and catastrophic: the intercom went dead; from the actions
of the pilot, the navigator knew that control of the aircraft had been stripped
away as the hydraulic system bled its pressure and fluid. The pilot gave the navigator a thumbs-up
gesture to eject. The navigator ejected
almost immediately, but the adrenaline charged situation altered human
perception of time to slow motion amid the chaos aboard Bat 21. The navigator went through the few steps
necessary for a safe ejection from the stricken aircraft and then looked down
to assure his feet were positioned for ejection. He could see the ground – 25,000 feet below –
between his feet; he also saw the pilot going through what appeared to be the
ejection sequence. The navigator pulled
up the handles which armed his ejection seat; ejection came with a mere touch
of the triggering mechanism.
The struggle for survival was just beginning. The first SA-2 had struck Bat 21, but Soviet Tactical Doctrine called for two missiles to be launched to increase the likelihood that at least one missile would hit the target. Even though no one saw it there was almost certainly another SA-2 closing in on the mortally wounded Bat 21.
Everything
worked as advertised. The butt-snapper
kicked the navigator free of the seat and simultaneously armed his parachute
for an automatic opening. He was now
falling, free of the ejection seat. At
some point after he ejected from the EB-66, the navigator heard a loud
explosion. He said he didn’t know whether it was the aircraft exploding or
another SAM detonating.
A
seat pack full of survival equipment was tied to him by the parachute harness,
he wore a nylon-mesh survival vest which carried more equipment, including a
hand-held emergency radio and a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver. Even though his parachute had been armed to
automatically open at 14,000 feet, the navigator was falling through clouds; he
was disoriented and was unable to see the ground. Unwilling to trust the barometer in his
parachute to open the parachute automatically, he reached for the T-handle on
the chute and pulled. The response was
immediate and hard! He knew from the
opening force that he must still be well above 14,000 feet.
The
parachute canopy was open now; and it was in one piece! No tears in the nylon, and all the shroud
lines were in good order. The emergency
procedures training he had received came in bits and pieces. As he had been trained to do, he pulled an
activating tab on his seat pack deployed a life raft and dropped his survival
gear away from the remains of the seat pack to dangle by a lanyard. Now he was configured for landing.
But
where was he? At about 10,000 feet he
had descended below most of the clouds; now he could see the ground. Well below him was a O-2A observation
plane. The little Cessna
"pushmepullyou" was piloted by a US Air Force Forward Air Controller
(FAC) who was probably out trying to find out what the North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) was up to. The navigator reached
for the hand-held emergency radio tucked into a pocket in his survival
vest. It was a gross violation of
survival training – and good sense – to pull the radio out while he was still
coming down in his parachute. There was
no lanyard attached to the radio; if he dropped it, it would be gone. If he didn't drop it on the way down, he
could lose it or damage it on landing.
Without that little radio his survival and rescue would be much more
difficult: he would be unable to communicate with the Search and Rescue (SAR)
aircraft sure to come to his aid. Still,
the sight of the FAC below him was enough to overcome training and good
sense. On UHF Guard channel he made his distress call to the FAC.
Bat 21 Bravo needed help! In
rescue parlance the navigator assumed the call sign Bat 21 Bravo, or, the
second crew member on board the EB-66C.
The pilot would have been Bat 21 Alpha, and the Ravens would have had
suffixes Charlie, Delta, Echo, and Foxtrot.
Only Bat 21 Bravo would ever transmit a call for help.
The
FAC responded immediately and asked Bat 21 Bravo for his position. The navigator told him. Standing his little O-2A on a wing, the FAC
spotted Bat 21 Bravo, still several thousand feet above his aircraft. For the next few minutes, an eternity seemed
to pass while Bat 21 Bravo descended under his nylon canopy; the FAC circled
and marked his position. At least when
he hit the ground, someone would know where he was. Rescue should be a snap.
Bat
21 was not the only aircraft which had been fired on. Bat 22 was also a target. The North Vietnamese were clever; they had
seen the EB-66 SAM evasive maneuver many times before and now anticipated
it. At the sound of the rattlesnake and
the EWO's call to break, the pilot of Bat 22 began the maneuver: full throttles, a 90 degree roll away from
the threat, a high speed turn and descent followed by a reversal of the turn
and a rapid climb. If it worked, and it
usually did, the high speed missile simply would be unable to follow the aircraft
through the maneuver and would pass by harmlessly. This time, however, as Bat 22 was reversing
in the bottom of its maneuver, two SA-2s streaked by. It was an ambush, and it almost worked.
The
crews of the two Bats were not the only ones defending the B-52 strike; two
F-105G "Wild Weasels" were also
working the mission. The job of
the Wild Weasels was SAM hunter-killer.
Armed with three anti-radiation missiles and a 20-millimeter Gatling gun
in the nose, each of the Weasels was quite capable of dealing with a SAM site –
if and when they dared to bring up their tracking and guidance radars. The radar signals had come up, but behind the
two Wild Weasels; their crews had anticipated a threat from North Vietnamese
territory across the DMZ. By the time
the Weasels were in position to fire on the SAM site the North Vietnamese
manning that missile site had "pulled the plug;" the radars were no
longer transmitting. Those guys
operating that SAM site knew what they were doing. The Wild Weasel flight lead looked up to
check the airspace for more missiles, but all he saw the mortally wounded Bat
21 in a 60 degree dive and trailing a great white plume behind it. Bat 21 then broke into two or three large
pieces and disappeared into the clouds.
The
Command Post Hot Line in the Frag Shop tinkled, and I picked it up. The officer controller simply said, "Bat
21 has been shot down." I ran to
next door to the command post to find out what had happened. As I got there I could hear the report still
coming in. Bat 22 had made a HF-radio
phone patch with Apache Control (the local command post) through the Korat HF
radio station. The initial report said
two chutes; it didn't sound good. All
around me things began to happen: two
intelligence officers rushed in with personal data on the crew of Bat 21 and
made AUTOSEVOCOM contact with the Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC); it would help in any
rescue attempt. The Deputy Commander for
Operations came in to assess the situation;
the crews had nicknamed him "Warhawk" in recognition of his
aggressive style. He listened grimly
while the officer controller briefed him on what was known: one EB-66C was
down; now only one chute reported seen.
SAR was in progress. Warhawk
seemed to think the Bats were flying where they weren't supposed to be, but after
a quick look at the map it was apparent that the NVA had moved what was
presumed to be a non-mobile SAM site into Quang Tri Province in South Vietnam
and had launched several missiles from it.
Yes
indeed, SAR was in progress. When Bat 21
Bravo's parachute had opened, it triggered a small radio inside his parachute
pack. The radio was a distress beacon
commonly known as a "beeper."
It sent out a distinctive distress call on UHF Guard Channel; its
beeping sound implied a frantic urgency that would alert anyone in the area
with a UHF radio receiver. It would
also effectively block radio transmissions with rescuers, so when the navigator
hit the ground, the first thing he did shut off the beeper and ditch his
parachute. At the same time, he decided to
get rid of that flight crew standard issue .38 caliber revolver all crew
members carried into combat. He had
decided he did not want to be tempted into a fire fight with people armed with
AK-47s. It was a personal choice. The cloudy, rainy conditions had helped mask
his descent and landing from the North Vietnamese. They knew a US plane had been shot down, but
they did not know where the crew members were or how many crew members were
down.
There
was now a race to see who would get to Bat 21 Bravo first. Bravo had landed in a cultivated area – a
rice paddy. It was rainy and misty on
the ground, but as he approached the ground, Bravo could see NVA on the ground
moving around. None were in his
immediate touchdown area. Pushing his
chute and revolver into a muddy dike containing the rice paddy, Bravo made his
way for the cover of a distant tree line.
At the same time Army helicopters patrolling the area picked up Bravo's
distress call and made their way to the scene.
The area was "hot."
Almost immediately one of the helicopters was shot down by NVA ground
fire; the other helicopters withdrew under heavy ground fire. By the time Bravo got to the cover of the
trees, the low visibility and the waning light made rescue all but impossible. He would have to spend the night on the
ground. The FAC looked over the area in
which Bravo was hidden; it looked reasonably secure for the time being. He contacted Bravo and assured him that he
would be back with a rescue force at first light.
In
the deepening gloom Bravo could see NVA regulars moving around. He had to find a place to hide until SAR came
back for him the next morning. Keeping
an eye on the NVA around him, Bravo finally found a downed tree overgrown with
vines; he crawled under it and tried to make himself hard to see. It appeared to Bravo that the NVA knew that
he was somewhere in the area, but they didn't know where; they were beating the
bushes for him in a random search. As
the forest darkened, NVA movement died down.
Just when it looked as if the danger of immediate capture had passed,
Bravo saw two NVA moving directly toward his position. "They must be coming to get me," he
thought, and tried to be as inconspicuous as he could.
Like
everyone else assigned to combat duty in Southeast Asia, Bravo had gone through
"Snake School" at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The idea behind the school was to refresh
skills learned from the basic survival course back in Washington State and to
introduce fliers to the jungle.
Introduction to the jungle meant being dropped off on a remote hillside
that was the lower slopes of a inactive volcano called Mount Pinatubo; it was
in the jungle west of Clark. Getting to
the training area involved trekking to a campsite at which an American
instructor and a Negrito guide would spend two days showing the flyer/students
what to do to avoid capture and how to survive until help arrived. The experience for the flyer/students
included being the quarry for selected members of the local Negrito
village. The Negritos' prize for being
the hunters was a one-pound bag of rice for every flyer they
"captured" during the hunt.
They were very good hunters. It
turned out that Bravo was a very good evader; he was one of the few that the
Negritos could not catch as the survival course unfolded.
Now,
two NVA soldiers walked directly toward Bravo's hiding place as if they surely
knew he was there. As they came closer,
Bravo saw that both were armed with AK-47s and one was carrying a radio pack on
his back. Closer and closer they came
until they stopped by the fallen tree.
"They must be toying with me," he thought, as the two soldiers
leaned against the tree for a smoke and a pee.
Happily, they didn't know he was there, and not being Negritos, they
failed to notice the subtle clues which could have given away Bravo's
presence. Having smoked and rested, the
two soldiers moved on, unaware that Bravo had lain within inches of their feet.
Bravo
was tucked in for the night, and slowly, the adrenaline that had kept him going
for the past few hours began to dissipate.
The situation was still tense, but not like the shoot-down and landing
had been. As he lay in his hiding place
it began to be apparent that his physical condition was less than
first-class. Until now the adrenaline
had masked an injury common to air crew who had ejected from the EB-66. The ejection seat on the bird was old
technology, and unlike the more modern rocket propelled seats, its function
depended on a rather large cannon shell.
The shell provided the propulsion that drove the seat free of the
aircraft if a crew member had to abandon the aircraft. The force of its detonation was far from
gentle and caused spinal injuries to anyone who was not positioned just so in
the seat at the moment of ejection because the force of the ejection came in a
very short time interval and was like a sharp kick rather than the firm push
the modern rocket seats provide. The
injury sustained is known as a spinal compression; anyone with such a back
injury finds it very difficult to move without pain. Because of the urgency of the situation,
Bravo had not been in the optimal position when the ejection came. He hurt, but not so badly that he couldn't
move. Still, any injury in his situation
was not good. Fortunately, his location
was known precisely by JRCC. There would
be a SAR at first light, and then he would be out of there and back home to
Korat.
At
first light the FAC was back and so was a SAR force. The SAR force normally consisted of a pair of
Sandys and a pair of rescue helicopters, plus whatever fighters were needed to
suppress ground fire prior to picking up the downed flier. In this case, there was also a Wild Weasels
SAM suppression package and some ECM support in the form of a pair of
EB-66Es. The Sandys were the rescue
supervisors. They flew Korean War
vintage Navy dive bombers (A1-Hs) which had been modified to a close air
support role. They were armed with 20
millimeter cannon in the wings and smoke rockets under the wings (the smoke
rockets were not intended for attack, but for marking an area as, e.g., a
source of ground fire, enemy troops, the location of the downed flier,
etc. They also carried other ordinance
under the wings which could be used to prevent a downed flier from being
captured if the NVA were nearby. The
ordinance took two forms: an explosive
munition and a munition that rendered anyone it came in contact with incapable
of acting coherently. The second form of
ordinance could be used if the downed flier was in imminent danger of capture;
the explosives could be used to seal off the flier from enemy forces if the
rescue attempt needed more time to succeed.
The helicopters (HH-3s or HH-53s, also known as Jolly Green Giants and
Super Jollies, respectively) were armed for defense only, with M-60s or a
couple of miniguns (small caliber gatling guns) to suppress ground fire if they
came under attack during a pick-up attempt.
SAM suppression consisted of the Wild Weasels and a flight of F-4s armed
with CBU (cluster bomb units) or Mark 82s plus the two EB-66Es to provide ECM support since there were SAMs known to be
active in the area. Finally, the FAC
himself, would be there to spot targets and mark whatever he could with his own
"WP" (white phosphorus) smoke rockets, commonly referred to as
"Willie Pete," Unlike the
Sandys, the FACs carried only smoke rockets under their wings. It seemed to irritate the FACs that they
could not directly take the fight to the enemy, since the smoke rockets
couldn't do much damage. However, every
once in a while, a FAC would get lucky, and his smoke rocket would actually hit
what he was trying to mark; if there were sufficient numbers of explosives or
flammables around, the FAC would be treated to a string of secondary explosions
of his own making.
On
this Monday morning, the SAR force contacted Bat 21 Bravo, and the rescue
attempt began. The NVA were waiting, of
course, as they almost always were in a case such as this. We usually expended a great deal of time,
effort, resources – and blood – to rescue a downed flier, and the NVA knew it
was a good time to do some shooting.
This, however, was not a rescue in the ordinary sense, since there was
so much AAA/SAM (anti-aircraft artillery/surface to air missile) around, as
well as a large concentration of enemy troops.
The attempt began by the FAC and the Sandys patrolling the area looking
for the guns and SAMs they knew were there.
Predictably, the guns would open up occasionally, giving away their
positions, and the Sandys would call in the suppression fighters to knock out
the shooters. That never got all the
guns, and there could be a heated exchange during the actual pick-up attempt,
if the surviving guns were close enough to the downed flier to cause trouble. The SAMs in the area were a source of danger
not usually present in a rescue attempt.
This morning, they were up and active; and the prowess they had
demonstrated the day before in shooting down Bat 21 was not diminished. The unarmed EB-66s were in close to the SAMs,
partly because the crews were unsure of the location of the SAMs and partly
because one of their own was down there waiting to be picked up. Again, the weather was acceptable but not
good. The SAM sites fired; the Weasels
fired back, and the EB-66s executed their SAM evasion maneuvers. It was common practice for the SAM crews to
fire at the EB-66s first to force them into evasive maneuvers and thus reduce
their ECM effectiveness. This Monday morning
there were a lot of SA-2s being fired.
The
NVA defenses were in the immediate area of Bravo, although he did not know it
the night before. When the rescue
attempt began, the world seemed to erupt in gun fire and missile launches. The battle was hot and heavy, and Bravo
joined in as best he could by spotting enemy guns and SAMs and calling their
locations to the SAR forces. The
suppression fighters went "Winchester," and new suppression
forces were sent in to replace them. By
the end of the day the area was still too hot to send in the rescue helicopters
to attempt a pick-up. Bravo would have
to spend another night on the ground, and since he had, more or less,
compromised his location by helping spot for the SAR forces, the NVA had a much
better idea of where to look for him. As
a result, as night approached, he was "tucked in" with area denial munitions by the SAR
forces. That presented a problem for the
NVA, if they were intent on capturing Bravo; it also presented a problem to
Bravo, since his movements were limited to the inside perimeter of where the
area denial munitions had been dropped.
Once dropped, the munitions made no distinction between friend and foe;
they simply exploded when disturbed.
I
cannot directly appreciate the violence of the SAR's suppression efforts that
first day; I have never been in their line of fire. I have had some experience
with nearby detonations of Mark 82s, and I have seen the effects of CBU-52 from
afar. In either case the effect is
spectacular.
One
day at Korat, after the events of this story had played out, a flight of F-4s
was departing on a strike mission. As
the lead F-4 broke ground the pilot raised the landing gear handle to retract
the landing gear; simultaneously, all twelve of the Mark 82s he was carrying
fell off the wings (no explanation as to why).
The bombs went skittering down the runway as the second F-4 rolled
through them on his takeoff roll.
Fortunately, the second F-4 was able to clear the loose bombs and get
airborne before any detonations took place.
One of the bombs did explode from the heat of friction as it bounced and
slid down the runway; it was designated a "low order explosion,"
since not all the explosive in the case had detonated. Even so, I was a quarter mile away from the
detonation point, standing at a desk and talking on the phone. The force of the explosion literally folded
me over the desk, and all the light diffusers from the overhead florescent
light came raining down as a result of the over pressure. If that was a low order detonation, I would
hate to see the real thing.
CBU
was another animal. It was a case with
softball sized bomblets that were dispensed from their casing after release
from the aircraft. They covered a large
rectangular area. I had seen their
effects at night out on The Trail when fighters and AAA got into a duel. You would see the gun fire (bright muzzle
flash), and then, several seconds later, you would see an area I would
conservatively estimate as the size of a football field begin to sparkle with
light. The sparkles would go on for
several seconds. I asked one of the
fighter jocks who also worked the Frag Shop about the effects of CBU. He described it like this: With the smaller of the two weapons they
carried, if you dropped it on a truck, there was a cloud of smoke and
dust. When the smoke and dust cleared
away, there was a truck with a lot of holes in it. When the larger weapon (the one most
frequently carried) was dropped on a truck, there was a huge cloud of smoke and dust.
When the smoke and dust cleared away, you could see truck parts hanging
in the trees – that was all. The latter
weapons were the ones being used to suppress AAA and SAM.
By
the third day, a substantial number of guns and all the SAMs had been
eliminated, but because of the troops in the area, the area was still too hot
for a rescue attempt. The battle
continued. Those of us at Korat were
beginning to wonder how long Bravo could hold out. The batteries in his radio were only good for
36 hours at best, and he had been on the ground far longer than that. There was also the problem of food and water;
being confined by the area denial munitions, that could well become a
problem. He could literally be starved
out if he wasn't rescued soon.
The
implications of his situation were not lost on the rest of us. We all began carrying all the spare batteries
and flares we could fit into our survival vests. Some even began carrying more ammunition, but
most opted for the ability to signal rather than the ability to wage a ground
war. What none of us knew at the time
was that Bravo was kept resupplied in his containment area by aerial drops of
food, batteries, and other things to keep him an active player in his
rescue. We didn't know because, being
crew members and subject to capture, we didn't need to know. There are many other things crew members
don't need to know – for the same reason.
After
the SAMs were cleared out of Bravo's area, the SAR settled into a daily cat and
mouse game with the NVA who wanted to capture Bravo – and to inflict as much
damage on the rest of the force as possible.
We in the 42nd TEWS went back to doing our regular missions, and
maintained a listening watch for Bravo whenever we were in his vicinity. After the end of the war, the North
Vietnamese stated that they were astounded that we would waste so much time,
effort and resources on trying to recover a single downed flier. They, on the other hand, did little, if
anything, to rescue their pilots downed by US aircraft. Of course, their fliers were down in fairly
friendly territory, but if a flier was injured, either during a fight or after
ejecting, he was pretty much on his own for rescue.
After
nearly a week of the daily game of trying to get the AAA and small arms
suppressed enough, for a recovery attempt, a flight of Super Jollys made a try
for Bravo. Ground fire was intense, and
the lead Jolly was shot down. It had
taken a lot of fire going in for the pick-up and began burning. It attempted to withdraw under the covering
fire of the SAR forces, but it had been mortally wounded. Burning fiercely as it tried to withdraw from
the scene, it crashed into the jungle; all six crew members died.
With
the loss of the Super Jolly and its crew, it became obvious that the usual
method of rescue and recovery was not going to work. Something new had to be tried, and, if I
recall correctly, it was Bravo himself who came up with part of the
scheme. He was known to all of us in the
42nd TEWS as an avid – almost fanatic – golfer.
Now he began putting the knowledge of all the golf courses he had played
in the past to work toward his rescue.
Using references to particular holes on golf courses that he had played
in the past, he communicated with the FAC proposed directions and paths of
movement to improve his chances of being picked by SAR forces. It worked.
He had a virtually secure method of talking about position, direction,
and distance without letting the NVA know where he was or where he was
going. It was a sure bet that the NVA
were monitoring his communications with SAR forces, but it did them no good
since he was using his "golf course" code. Still, no matter how he maneuvered, the ring
of NVA encircling him remained closed.
Things
were beginning to become critical for Bravo.
Even with SAR forces dropping supplies to him, his physical condition
was not improving. He said later that he
was almost in a dream-like state. He
recalled awakening in the pre-dawn darkness to see a rising moon through the
trees. It became a disorienting
experience, and he could not tell, for a time, whether he was actually there or
whether he was looking at a painting.
The
SAR was still in progress because there was still contact with Bravo. Sometimes, when were flying in the area where
he was evading, we could hear the FAC talking to him. We could not hear his part of the conversation,
since his radio did not have much range.
Still, it was heartening to know that he was still there and that there
was still a chance. The 42nd TEWS
squadron commander had set up a running report of all the "sanitized"
information available on Bravo and the rescue attempt. I say sanitized because, again, as combat
crew members, we had no need to know, and our capture could compromise things
for Bravo or the SAR forces. I think
everyone read the reports daily, I know I did.
JRCC
had been working up a plan to recover Bravo, and in the end it was an
application of force by the BUFs that was the key to success. It went something like this: the FAC told Bravo not to change his position
after he had been "tucked in" for the night. The FAC promised to return at first
light. Bravo had read a hint in the
FAC's voice that something unusual was going to happen, but he didn't have a
clue as to what it might be. Bravo slept
fitfully. Then, about 0300, he said, he
heard a sound that he described to us as the sound of one hundred freight
trains bearing down on him – then the ground shook violently. Three B-52s had released their bomb loads
very near by; there was no need to speculate where because the target was obvious. Three BUFs, carrying upwards of 105 bombs
each, had solved in thirty seconds what had stymied the SAR forces for, now,
more than a week. After the explosions
died away, it was silent again.
The
FAC returned at first light, as promised, and made contact with Bravo. Using their golf course code, the FAC
directed Bravo southward toward a river.
He was told he would meet his rescuers there. He started walking through the area that had
been bombed just three hours earlier by the B-52s; he simply described it to us
later as a scene of devastation. He gave
no details.
Finally,
he came to the river and stopped. The
FAC was still with him, but it was ground forces who would be his actual
rescuers. A US Navy SEAL and a South Vietnamese Petty Officer were coming up river to look for him (although he didn't know that at the
time). He began his trek down river
toward the sea as darkness fell. Staying
in the river, he moved all night, and as daylight approached, he moved toward
the river bank. Someone was coming from
down river. As he lay hidden along the
bank, a boat came into view; it was his two rescuers. Since they were in enemy territory,
and ready for action, Bravo did not want to reveal himself abruptly. It would have been ironic to be shot by your
own people after having survived being shot down and evading the NVA for over a
week. He reached down into the water and
splashed it with his hand. The Navy officer called his name; he responded, and the two rescuers moved to the bank
to pick him up.
We
were quietly jubilant when we heard that Bravo had been picked up and was on
his way to the hospital at Clark AB, Philippines. We all assumed that the rest of the crew were
dead since there had been nothing but a very early report to indicate that
anyone other than Bravo had managed to escape the death plunge of Bat 21. However, there were some indications that we
did not know the whole story. For one
thing, there was a telephone conversation I had with a DDO at Blue Chip soon after Bravo's rescue. We were
discussing something about the fact that the rest of the crew did not survive
when he blurted out, "You mean you don't know about Alfa?" When I pressed him for information, he shut
up; it was evident that he was talking to someone who was authorized only
sanitized information. In addition, we
were talking via an unsecured line.
Whatever information he had about Alfa, the pilot of Bat 21, was never
revealed.
Bravo
briefly "came home" to Korat to pick up his personal belongings and
process out of the 42nd TEWS. It was
several weeks after his rescue, and he had recovered sufficiently to be
transferred to a stateside hospital. He
was still suffering from the injuries incurred in his ordeal, but he did make a
public appearance before all who were interested in him and about what had
happened.
I
remember it well. The meeting place was
Richter Hall, a small auditorium in which large-scale briefings could be
given. It was named after 1st Lt. Karl
Richter, a Thud pilot who had been killed in 1967 on his 198th combat mission over North
Vietnam. There were a number of crew
members from the 42nd TEWS as well as fighter crew members who were interested
in hearing about a successful E&E first hand. The 388th Tactical Fighter
Wing Commander introduced Bravo, who was not on stage at that moment. At his introduction, Bravo came out from
behind a curtain; it was evident from the way he walked that Bravo was
suffering from back injuries at the very least.
He said a few words about how glad he was to be back, that his rescuers
were some of the greatest people he had ever known, and that he would be going
back to States to be medically retired.
He pointed out the obvious by saying that his back needed more work and
a lot of time to heal. As I recall, he
said that he would be going to Tucson, Arizona, to live out a lifetime
dream: to live next to a golf
course. Then he said that he wanted to
show us something; he pulled out the survival radio he had used for over a week
out there in the Vietnam jungle. He said
he wanted to prove something. He turned
on the radio and held it up to the microphone at his podium; you could hear the
soft hiss of background noise coming from the radio. His point was that we all could have done
what he had done because our people cared about our well being.
He
gave us a run down of what happened; the past several paragraphs contain what I
remember Bravo saying during those few minutes he was on stage. Everyone seemed to hang on his words. He told us about his pick up by his rescuers, about an NVA patrol that had blocked him and his
rescuers and as they were trying to exit enemy territory, about the FAC who had
worked so long on his rescue and recovery.
He told us that the FAC had come over to Clark and had visited him in
the hospital. He left no doubt that he
felt a deep gratitude for what that captain had done for him. He concluded his comments by hinting that
perhaps Alfa would be recovered also.
The hair rose on the back of my neck at the mention that Alfa might
still be alive; I remembered the chat I had with the DDO from Saigon.
Not
many weeks after Bravo left, my time at Korat RTAB was almost up, and I was
getting ready to return to "the land of the big BX." I was processing out of the 42nd TEWS. There weren't many people around that
afternoon; US air forces were heavily engaged in attacking strategic targets in
North Vietnam and most crews were either flying, resting, or getting ready to
fly. I wandered into the administrative
office that handled recommendations for awards and decorations. The office was empty of people, but I saw, at
the top of a stack of papers a recommendation for the Silver Star; Bravo was
the nominee. The citation described how
he had assisted in his own rescue; there were other things that he had done as
well, and it was all in the citation. As
I wandered around the squadron building, looking for a particular person to
sign off on my out processing, I peeked into the crew lounge to see if anyone
was there; like most other rooms in the building, it was silent. I looked around, and then I looked up at the
far wall. Someone had a plaque made and
hung it up for all to see. It was just a
simple piece of wood and a thin sheet of brass.
On it were words that simply said, "In memory of the crew of Bat
21, April 2, 1972."
Alfa
would never return. I watched the lists
of names when the POWs were returned; his name was not on the list. The names of the other missing crew members
aboard Bat 21 were also absent. A year
or two later, after the POWs had been returned, I saw two pictures in one of
the weekly news magazines (Time or Newsweek).
The pictures accompanied an article about MIAs. One was a picture of an elderly balding man
who looked like the stereotype Godfather.
He was carrying a sign which asked the whereabouts of Anthony Giannangali. The other picture was of a well dressed
middle aged couple; they carried a sign wanting to know were their son, Robin
Gatwood, was. I found myself wishing I
could tell them what had happened.
as I remember it. I only sat there for a sortie one time, and that was on one last flight for the month's flight pay before we graduated. The instructors were busy monitoring student progress on whatever it was they were practicing, day celestial, I think. The students were officers and a couple of them kept bugging me wanting to know where we were on that Edinburgh-to-Sweetwater route we all recall so well. I just ignored them. What could they do? I noted one detail about the Master Radar position that escaped me as a student navigator: That half a dog house looking thing sitting on top of the indicator is part of the radar scope camera mechanism. It houses a mirror assembly that directs an image of the radar scope itself to a 35mm film canister mounted behind the dog house. You can see the back end of the film canister just behind the yoke that suspends the radar indicator. I learned about radar scope photography flying the EB-66C in Southeast Asia. As an aside, in Southeast Asia they suggested to you that if you found yourself to be temporarily disoriented, you should remove the cover of the film canister and shine a flashlight inside to make sure the film was feeding properly.
mounting bracket on the rim of the astrodome. Perfect. Almost. You with sharp eyes will note that the astrocompass is pointed 90 degrees off of where it should be pointed. Some day I'm going to have to go out there and correct that minor error.
